Once there was an old Jew living in a small town in Poland. His name was Mordechai Magid. He was the town carpenter, and he got along well with his neighbors in the village, and they all valued his work. But as such things go, the time came when the government decreed that all the Jews in Poland must either convert to Catholicism or be expelled from the country — or worse.
The villagers didn't want to lose old Mordechai. So the priest came to him and said, "Mordechai, you're our friend. You've lived here for many years. You've been our carpenter. You've helped everyone out. We want you to be able to stay. So I beseech you, please convert to Catholicism and stay here among your friends."
Mordechai thinks about it and says, "Well, what do I have to do to become a Catholic?"
The priest says, "First, you have to accept Jesus Christ as your Savior, and then there are certain things that you as a Catholic have to do. Every Sunday we expect you to show up in church, and on Fridays you're not allowed to eat meat — you have to have fish." Things like that. "Can you do it?"
Mordechai thinks and says, "All right, I'll become a Catholic." And the priest is very happy. He makes the sign of the cross over Mordechai's head and says, "All right, today I give you the new name Barry. Now you're a Catholic."
So time goes on, and everything seems to be working out very well. Barry shows up in church every Sunday; there doesn't seem to be any problem. But one day the priest decides, just to make sure, to pay him a visit on Friday night. He knocks on the door, and Barry invites him in. Dinner is about to be put on the table, and the priest sniffs. It's very suspicious. It certainly smells like there's a big side of beef being cooked. And sure enough, Barry opens the oven and out comes this big roast. He puts it in the middle of the table and invites the priest to sit down.
The priest says, "But Barry, you know, as a Catholic, you're supposed to eat fish on Friday night."
Barry nods, makes the sign of the cross over the beef, and says, "Now it's a fish."
Now, as you remember, Wittgenstein said a philosophy could be written in the form of jokes. And Zen may enact that in its koan collections, which in some sense are joke collections. But given that today is April 1st, I thought we could teach even more explicitly with a joke that actually has rather complicated philosophical implications.
In the story, it asks: what does make somebody a Jew? What makes them a Catholic? The priest seems to occupy the position that says being a Catholic is a matter of what you say you believe and what you do. But old Mordechai says there's something essential, intrinsic, about being a Jew, which isn't going to be changed by making the sign of the cross or going to church or eating fish instead of beef. It's a very stark contrast between an essentialist and a performative, or social constructivist, perspective on identity.
Now, as Buddhists, typically we would side with the priest in this story. Buddhists typically claim that there is no fixed essential nature. There's no real me deep inside that is independent of our circumstances or what we do or how we relate. This self of ours is constantly changing and constantly being co-created by interaction — co-dependent origination. And the original enlightenment experience of Shakyamuni was said to reveal that all things are empty of essential nature, impermanent, and interconnected.
And the original sangha that formed around the Buddha and followed the monastic rules of the Vinaya was intended, through a particular form of life, to express this basic truth. They would be homeless. They would have no fixed abode, no possessions. They would be dependent on begging. The way they lived their life would reflect the reality of impermanence and interdependence. Who they were would be reflected in what they did and would be inseparable from that.
One of the transformations that has taken place in contemporary lay practice is the assertion that the basic truth of impermanence and interdependence is true everywhere and in every circumstance. Whatever life you lead is still going to be subject to change. Whatever life you try to lead is still going to be subject to cause and effect. You don't have to live any special way to see those things manifesting all the time. Thus we can say: each moment, life as it is, the only teacher. Life as it is, in any setting whatsoever, is going to display change and interdependence. It may be that some forms of life rub your nose in it, and other forms of life seem to give you a chance to deny or conceal it. But everything, one way or another, is going to show you those basic realities.
How, then, do we practice, and what difference does the form of practice make? For Dōgen, when he talked about the identity of practice and realization, he was first of all talking to monks who were already immersed in a ritualized form of life and meditation practice. And he was basically saying to them: don't think of yourselves as deluded, and that by doing this, someday maybe you're going to get enlightened. Don't think of it in that instrumentalized, means-to-an-end kind of way. Realize that what you're doing already manifests realization.
Now, as the inheritors of that practice, we can take that in two very different kinds of directions. One, a traditionalist, orthodox way, says that that form of life uniquely embodies realization. That by wearing those robes, shaving your head, getting up at those hours, performing these services, sitting these many hours in zazen, doing the rituals of the kitchen and the bathroom and everything else of the monastic rules — by living that life, we are performing realization. In the same way that the ascetic-mendicant community around Shakyamuni said that their form of life was performing realization.
Now, it's important that they each said that, even though the forms of life they were talking about were very different. By the time Buddhism went from China to Japan, it had settled into monasticism, as opposed to being mendicant. It went from formlessness to a particular form. But in each case, the claim was that that form of life was performative of realization.
It's important that we be clear about this notion of the performative. In regard to the joke again, it's a question of whether you are essentially something, and because you're already that, it's going to be true almost regardless of what you do — you're going to be the Jew whether you go to church or not. Versus the idea that it's by following the laws of kosher and Sabbath that you become a Jew, and by going to church on Sunday and eating fish on Fridays that you become a Catholic. Where does your nature reside? In an internal essence, or in a set of practices?
The place in our contemporary secular society where this is argued out most now generally has to do with issues of sexuality and gender. The idea of the performative philosophically starts with J. L. Austin, who said some language makes things happen. It's not just a description of things; by saying it, something changes. He used the example of a minister saying, "I now pronounce you man and wife." The words were themselves an action. They weren't a description of something — they performed something.
Simone de Beauvoir, in The Second Sex, famously said, "A woman is made, not born" — that femininity was not an essential inner quality, but a social construct, and one that was typically determined to be inferior. Our society has always operated with polar dichotomies, like strong and weak, independent and dependent, rational and emotional. And every time there was a lesser half of one of those dichotomies, it was called feminine.
In more recent times, you get the work of Judith Butler, most notably in her book Gender Trouble, where she talks about gender as performative — particularly, again, that the feminine is something that is socially constructed. And for many people, particularly many women and lesbians, this became an idea that allowed for a great deal of agency and freedom in the reconstruction and reassertion of their identity. The idea is that if your gender is a social construct, it is not given, it is not immutable. It is reflective of behaviors and social norms, and these things can be changed and modified.
However, it's very interesting to note that, just like the dilemma of the Jew versus the Catholic in the joke, when it came to the history of male gay liberation, and currently discussions of trans identity, the argument was exactly the opposite: that male homosexuality and trans identity were something that you were born with, and that you needed the freedom to allow to come out. And so there's been a great renewal of this essentialist-versus-social-constructivist controversy.
You could say the original idea of homosexuality was that it was socially constructed, but as psychopathology — the idea that if you were too close to your mother and had an absent father, this was a kind of familial structure that gave rise to a certain kind of personality disorder. And homosexuality got put in that diagnostic category. And it was thought that the only way to liberate it from a pathological description was to say it was essential — ideally, that there was a gene for homosexuality, and it was normal. So that was an attempt to escape a pathologizing kind of social constructivist narrative. It served a very good purpose for a generation, but then it ran into crosscurrents of competing narratives, where social constructivism was in turn seen as liberating.
There is no decided fact of the matter here. If nothing else, it demonstrates the way in which essentialist narratives and social constructivist narratives have different functions at different times in our society, and we have to be a little bit leery of assuming one way or the other is the truth.
Well, this all gets very serious, from an old Jewish joke. But I bring all this up because it really calls into question a great deal of how we think about how we practice, and what our identity is as practitioners, or as Zen Buddhists. Many people think of practice as something they do, but not who they are. For myself, I tend to think of those things together, and so I say I am a Zen Buddhist — because I do all this stuff. I wasn't born that way. I didn't grow up in a Zen Buddhist family. I was born in Lubbock, but I wasn't born Buddhist. So to the extent that I am Buddhist, it clearly is a matter of: I started doing these kinds of practices, performed these kinds of rituals, did these chants, went to a teacher, did all this stuff. It was not the way in which I was born Jewish. And in that community, whether I went to synagogue or not, somebody would still say, "Well, deep down, no matter what you do, you're a Jew."
Now, we tend not to think of Buddhism that way. Judaism operates at a cusp between practice and ethnic identity. You have to sort out: are you Jewish as an ethnic or racial heritage, the way John is Irish? Or are you Jewish because you keep kosher and go to the synagogue, the way I'm Buddhist because I come to a zendo?
Since all of us are Buddhists, to the extent that we are, because of what we do, not how we were born, we have to pay attention to what the things are that we do that we think are essential to that definition. What are the minimum requirements to feel that way about yourself?
If you go to Asian countries, to be a Zen teacher would almost certainly mean being a monastic. The idea of a lay teacher would be almost an oxymoron. Even for the Japanese, apparently, there's a great deal of difficulty when they go, for instance, to Southeast Asia. The Japanese priests are married, and the Southeast Asian ones say, "Are you kidding me? A married priest? That's another oxymoron."
So for us, the question is what kinds of behaviors or practices make us what we are. Is doing a certain kind of practice religiously what this is about? There's certainly a kind of Zen that's been transplanted here that would say you're a Zen Buddhist if you're an ascetic vegetarian meditator — that there are certain kinds of lifestyle decisions, as well as certain meditative practices, that have to go together. And the question is whether the adherence to these things makes us what we are. If you live in a residential or monastic community — even some watered-down version of what Duncan was doing — it's following a certain set of rules that makes you a Zen Buddhist.
Now, I think that in any kind of culture like that, there's a great danger that identity devolves into rule-following. And interestingly, I think that's one of the important functions of April Fools' Day, and Carnival in a broader sense: every now and then, ritually, the rules are turned upside down. All the things that we usually do to define ourselves get violated or played with.
We almost had a nice enactment of that earlier. When I came back in — being old, half-blind, and absent-minded — I went over to the rack and put on Chris's rakusu. And he missed his cue. Instead of putting on my rakusu and continuing through the day and seeing how long it would take me or anybody else to notice, he corrected me and gave it back right away. But that's a kind of carnival opportunity, to ask: what is it exactly that makes the teacher? Is it this brown thing rather than the black thing? Because if you wore the brown one, you might have to give the talk.
Sesshin itself is obviously a very formal, ritualized, disciplined kind of thing to do. It has a certain function, but it can get precious. It can get rigid. Every now and then we have to turn it upside down and say it's not just the rules that make it a sesshin.
And what does make it a sesshin, then? I would say it's that it is this strange, disciplined opportunity to pay attention to the fact that, in the end, we don't have to do anything in order to receive these basic truths of impermanence and interconnection. They display themselves all the time. Our ongoing ordinary life is organized around control — around trying to make things stay permanent, whether they're things in the world or inner states that we like and want to hold on to.
And the big danger in a sesshin is that it exactly replicates that mentality of control. It becomes this very controlled, disciplined environment in which we try to control our inner mental states, hold on to the ones we like and get rid of the ones we don't, and basically try to banish the idea of interdependence and impermanence. And if sesshin fails, it fails because we can almost do that for good stretches of time.
Sesshin succeeds just to the extent that you have unpredictable, uncontrollable experiences. That every now and then we go outside, we do something silly and un-Buddhist — that we don't do all the things that we think are the right thing to do. It's an opportunity to ask, as we said this morning: Who are you? What are you doing? What's happening?